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Interjections, such as those in the title, together with a few similar devices, when
qualifying clauses expressing truth-conditions, or that such conditions have been
satised, are entitled ‘force-ampliers’. Disputes between deationary and ina-
tionary truth-theories sometimes are assumed to turn on the supposed pivotal role
that these devices are construed as playing in the interpretation of the clauses they
qualify. I argue that they are not dispensable add-ons. Moreover, even in their ab-
sence the relevant clauses giving truth-conditions permit interpretations that are
not deationary-friendly. I maintain that this is a signicant fact about the use to
which writers put them. I then defend a thesis about force-ampliers that makes
them indispensable to the interpretation of the relevant clauses, and that renders
certain moves unavailable to popular deationist treatments.
Keywords: deationary theories of truth
1.
Consider interjections, such as those in the title, when occurring in clauses
expressing either truth-conditions or that such conditions obtain. For ex-
ample:
‘Coal is black’ is true if and only if coal really is black.
Fred believed the damage was due to a natural disaster and, indeed, it
was due to an earthquake.
What she suspected was in fact the case.
e proposition that salamanders are lizards is true only if salaman-
ders are actually lizards.
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It is not essential to the issues I shall raise that interjections like these
be present. Sometimes a mere inection, or the addition of a verbal parti-
cle will serve, as in ‘He thought the earth moves and the earth does move’.
I concentrate on the interjected words because they bring to the fore the
point of this discussion. Let us call all such occurrences of words from this
group (or their translations), even emphases, when, and only when, used in
the stating of truth-conditions or their satisfaction (/non-satisfaction) force-
ampliers. Force-amplication is not the only role of these sorts of elements,
perhaps not even their primary one. But, as I hope to show, it cannot be ig-
nored; its regular undervaluing (viz., ohand dismissal) has had an impact
on the give-and-take over theories of truth. Much later I extend the role of
force-amplication beyond truth, to referential relations generally.1 How-
ever, for the bulk of this essay I want to focus on truth. Wemay use the cover
term ‘signication’ (verb: ‘signify’) for all the various semantic word-world,
speaker-world, or thought-world relations covered (such as predication and
reference) by such terms.
I shall use ‘proposition’, unless otherwise specied, as an all-purpose
truth-bearer. Some have insisted that a proposition is what is expressed
rather than the vehicle of expression. But when the predicate ‘is true’ or the
operator ‘it is true that’ is deployed, philosophers have taken the term to
apply to a sentence, an assertion (/statement), and, whenever X is a propo-
sitional attitude, what is X-ed. As used here ‘proposition’ can serve as a cover
term for each of these candidate truth-bearers.2
Our four cases exemplify certain lessons. Some force-ampliers occur
in conditionals or biconditionals, others in conjunctions. e third case
above shows that force-ampliers need not occur in compounds and need
not specify the proposition in question.e secondone illustrates thatwords
for truth neednot occur in the formula, and that the truth-condition in ques-
tionmay be phrased dierently from the proposition whose truth it is stand-
ing for. (For simplicity, andwith one pointed exception, I employ only speci-
cations which do not deviate in this way from those of their truth-bearers.)
Nevertheless, each of the right-hand sides mentioned above specify a truth-
condition (or, that one is met) for what is mentioned on the le-hand side
of the formula.at feature is the focus of my discussion.
1 is is an exception to the ‘only’-restriction in the earlier formulation. I leave it unmodied
because the exception is an isolated case, our interest throughout the bulk of this discussion
is on truth-conditions, and the cases of stating truth or referential conditions does x on
the force-amplication role of these devices.
2 e one thing it fails to cover are ultra-Russellian propositions that, having individuals
and property-instances as their constituents, are indistinguishable from states of aairs and
(would-be) facts.
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e claim defended in this essay is that force-ampliers supply instruc-
tions for taking the clauses they govern a certain way. ey compel us to
adopt what I later describe as a semantically dierentiated reading (or in-
terpretation). Some of those I am critiquing below, so-called “deationary
theorists”may accept thatmuch. But, as I hope to show, that requires that we
understand their signature formulas in ways incompatible with the conclu-
sions they seek to draw from them.ese points can be understood properly
only aer we have explained in greater detail what is meant by a semanti-
cally dierentiated interpretation. However, getting clearer on semantically
dierentiated readings will require that we also say something about truth-
condition specications in which amplication is merely optional, which,
in turn, takes us to the heart of deationary theories of truth. We shall take
up the rst two of these (viz., semantically dierentiated interpretations and
optional readings) in subsequent sections, but I turn rst to a brief sketch of
deationary theories of truth.
Deationism (about truth, hereaer understood) embraces a broad spec-
trum of theories, in which one of two constructions plays a central role.e
two, given here schematically, are:
(R) e proposition that p is true i p. (Or ‘It is true that p i p’)
(T) S is true (in L) i p
in which ‘S’ contains a structural description (or, quotation name framed in
object-language terms) of p in the relevant metalanguage. Deationists reg-
ularly take one of these to yield basically adequate accounts of the concept
truth.3 (I henceforth call them and their respective instances ‘equivalences’.)
Whenever the sentence/proposition in question is displayed, deationists
hold that this is all truth amounts to, while proposing supplementary ac-
counts for occurrences in which the bearer is not, or cannot be, displayed.
But (R) and (T) are believed to expose the structure for the general case, the
one which concerns us. All deationary theorists are committed, more or
less explicitly, to the following two theses about these cases:
(D1) e central case shows that we can have an adequate account of
truth without ametaphysical or relational theory of truth (say, cor-
respondence or coherence).
3 (R) in particular may create a worry about semantic paradoxes, a worry I set aside as or-
thogonal to the present discussion. If one prefers, one can think of an extremely long
or inexhaustible list of instances of atomic propositions in (R)—one of the views called
‘minimalism’—as the relevant deationist theory.
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(D2) What (R) and (T) show is that, in the central cases, whatever can
be conveyed in a sentence or thought employing mention of truth
can be more economically conveyed without it.4
By a correspondence theory I mean any view stating that truth is consti-
tuted by the relation of the truth-bearer to something on the order of a state
of aairs, fact, circumstance, situation, or even by a combination of indi-
viduals and properties. e inspiration behind (D1) is to replace this sort
of theory with one that lacks metaphysical or relational implications. us,
by deationism I intend to cover views that have typically gone under titles
such as redundancy, disquotationalism, minimalism, and prosententialism.5
Despite their signicant dierences, each puts their view forward as a can-
didate for the slot which correspondencemight otherwise occupy, thus their
commitments to (D1) and (D2). e exceptions—e.g., generalizations (say,
‘all propositions of the form ⌜p or not p⌝ are true’), indirect descriptions (say,
‘what Smithers said is true’)—are supplied only to show what utility a truth
predicate might nevertheless have.
My discussion proceeds as follows. In §2 I consider formulas in the spirit
of (R) and (T), and introduce my target interpretation. In §3 Alfred Tarski’s
view, the locus classicus of (T), is re-examined, largely because it is believed
in some circles that Tarski’s pioneering work leads ineluctably to this sort
of deationism—a view I there reject. In §4 we return to the topic of force-
ampliers, explaining both the popular view I reject and one I defend. To
strengthen my thesis, and weaken its leading alternative, in §5 I consider a
series of occurrences of ampliers in the literature. In §6 yet further support
for my claims is discovered in implications for closely related uses of the
entitled expressions. Finally, in §7 the thesis is extended to other referential
relations.
2.
First, the equivalences. Consider the familiar instances of our two schemata:
4 E.g. “. . .we nd that in all sentences of the form ‘p is true,’ the phrase ‘is true’ is logically
superuous.” (Ayer 1946, 88). “[W]e can simply lop o ‘It is true that’ from (R) and it will
make no dierence to what we want to say.” (Williams 1992, 101).
Not every deationist acknowledges (D2), and others have denied that deationists are
committed to it. But if they do not accept (D2), I do not see how they can believe they are
entitled to (D1).at is not to imply that this is the whole of their argument: they point to
other cases, in which semantic ascent is supposed to display the utility of a truth-predicate.
But how could they claim it is the whole of the predicate’s utility without (D2)?
5 Some writers who take one of these titles reject a commitment to deationism. e dis-
tinction in §2 explains what enables them to do so.
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‘Snow is white’ is true i snow is white.
e proposition that snow is white is true i snow is white.
ese are the homophonic, or homographic, instances deationists take
as most illustrative of the force of their view. On them, to obtain the right-
hand cognitive twin of the le-hand side, while scrapping the contentious
truth predicate, for (R) we simply denominalize the proposition, or, for (T),
disquote the sentence. (Regarding (T) this is a bit more involved because of
the needed coordination between metalanguage and object language. I set
aside the technical details here.) If this is the whole of the relevant point of
the equivalences in the context, (D2) is the obvious lesson. We then obtain
(D1) by showing that if so, there is no need to introduce the sorts of rela-
tions characterizing metaphysical theories of truth. (And if the message of
(D2) is not instrumental here, it is dicult for me to see how else (D1) might
be shown.) Call this reading of the equivalences an austere gloss. Some have
concluded that it allows one’s account of truth to remain neutral with respect
to any metaphysical implications of its concept or property, others draw the
more ambitious conclusion that there is no need for worldly truthmakers
anywhere. In either case, deationism must be construed as involved in the
same ballgame as correspondence and other traditional theories, for it pro-
motes itself as a competing answer to a common set of questions.
Deationists are thus committed to an austere gloss. But there is an-
other, and (I believe) more natural, interpretation of the equivalences than
austerity—a semantically dierentiated interpretation (or, more simply, a dif-
ferentiated interpretation).
To start us o, notice that once we look past the occurrence of ‘is true’,
themost salient dierence between the sides of both schematic equivalences
is the following. eir le-hand sides contain compound singular terms6
whose instances designate, express, or represent semantically evaluable items:
nouns formed with propositional clauses and names of sentences. By this I
do not mean that those phrases take semantic values such as true, but rather
that what they designate are themselves creatures of semantics (propositions
and sentences, respectively). How else could grammar allow them to take
distinctively semantic predicates? However, save for specialized topics, in
general the right-hand side of each does not take a semantic value. Although
the vehicle in the formulas is a sentential phrase, dierential interpretation
reads the right-hand side as “talking about” nothing but worldly (largely
nonsemantic) items. A rst temptation might be to say that p introduces
a state of aairs or a fact; and at least on the face of things states of aairs
6 I write loosely as if the schematic letters, and not just their substituends are designating
expressions.
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and facts are not semantic units. While that seems to me to be basically cor-
rect, it may be contested—indeed, has been—on two counts.
First, objections have been raised against the philosophical usefulness of
notions such as state of aairs and fact, or against principles for individuating
them. I shall not probe these allegations further here,7 but simply note that
although some nondeationists (= inationists) also accept such objections,
it has not prevented them from recognizing something or other as a truth-
maker that is not evaluable in semantic terms. us, unless it is assumed
that those philosophers are all quite confused, this is scarcely a mortal blow
to nondeationist interpretations.
Second, it is sometimes claimed that representational notions such as
mentioning, referring, naming, designating, denoting, signifying, express-
ing, or even representing itself do not apply at the level of whole sentences.
Notoriously, Frege thought that a sentence had a Bedeutung or object to
which it referred. For standard, extensional cases he chose its truth or falsity.
Even when philosophers suppose that whole sentences refer, Frege’s solution
is not widely accepted nowadays, save as a premiss from which to construct
reductios against certain theories of truth, causation, or fact. And problems
about the way in which sententially-articulated entities represent, or what
they represent, persist.
Notwithstanding these diculties, it seems beyond question that many
instances of p have individuable and identiable subject-matters. ey in-
troduce a specic target in a way not limited to the designations of their iso-
lated subject-terms or to extensions of their predicates. Consider a straight-
forward subject-predicate sentence—say, ‘Smithers is awake’. We may take
the subject-matter of the proposition expressed by that sentence (on an oc-
casion of use) as including both the subject referred to and the property or
action expressed as belonging to (or denied of) that subject. Of course, the
proposition might be false, in which case Smithers does not have the prop-
erty ascribed to him. Nevertheless, the whole package forms the subject-
matter of this sort of proposition. us, the sentence is, in this broader
sense, about Smithers being awake, or about a combination (plus a certain
structure) of Smithers, the relation of being in or having, and the state of
wakefulness. To deny that there is a distinctive subject-matter here com-
mits one to the view that the sentence’s semantics does not suit it for stating
one sort of thing any more than any other sentence would—say, the sen-
tences ‘the blade is rusty’ or ‘Smithers is a Rotarian’. And if one goes that
far, it is hard to see how we can account, in ordinary circumstances, for our
indispensable practice of choosing any particular sentence rather than any
other to convey what we want to communicate. Whatever diculties there
7 Dealt with more fully in (Vision 2004, ch 3.1)
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are in formulating this point rigorously, the need for some such relation-
ship is unavoidable on any serious scheme. I shall henceforth use the term
‘subject-matter’ for the sort of thing that is relevant to a sentence (or a sen-
tence as used) in this way. And, as with austere glosses, on dierentiated
interpretations we can extend the notion to other combinations of contents,
in particular to conjunctions such as that in our second example—viz., ‘Fred
believed the damage was due to a natural disaster and, indeed, it was due to
an earthquake’.
What has been said thus far is compatible with a broad selection of dif-
ferent views about how to construe the notion of a subject-matter. Still, it
is clear that whatever the details, the subject-matter of replacements for p
in our equivalences are not likely to be semantically evaluable creatures as
such. In a standard sort of case, they will be states or would-be states of the
world. In the rare case, they may be about what is semantically evaluable.
us, in the instance:
e proposition that snow is white is true is true if and only if
that snow is white is true
a phrase on the right-hand side (‘that snow is white’) designates something
that is semantically evaluable. But this results from special features of the
case at hand, not from a general trait of such equivalences.at the subject-
matter of the right-hand side is not a semantically evaluable unit per se is a
striking feature whose implications threaten the deationist line. Deation-
ists encourage us to pay attention to little more than the similar phrasing of
the two sides, and conclude simply that the equivalences show that what has
been stated with the predicate ‘is true’ can be stated without it, or that “noth-
ing is added to the thought by ascribing to it the property of truth” (Frege
1999, 88).8
Still, the case for semantically-dierentiated interpretations need not
rest on the idea of a subject-matter. Suppose there are no worldly corre-
lates for whole sentences. en let us say that the right-hand sides acquire
their semantic connections simply via their incorporated referential terms
and the designations or expressions of their predicates and relational expres-
sions. Combining these elements need constitute no unit such as a “fact” or
“state of aairs” that we can then deploy for theorizing.
e right-hand side can pick out worldly-conditions or a series of them,
which may produce the truth-conditions for the proposition or sentence on
the le-hand side. It may then follow that because we have arrived at this
8 Is Frege then a deationist? I refuse to enter into this exegetical quagmire. But comments
such as the one cited here have certainly inspired others who denitely consider themselves
deationists.
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by nothing more than reection on the equivalences, truth’s connection to
things and properties in the world should not be excluded from its con-
cept. e foregoing considerations leave it open that the relation may be
one-many, but not that the formula as a whole is to be taken nonrelationally.
ere is a legitimate philosophical dierence over the existence of factlike
entities, on which it is certainly an option to take a nominalist or elimina-
tivist view. But to suppose that the position one takes, say, on facts versus
individuals-plus-properties can mark a distinction between relational and
nonrelational theories of truth would mislocate that dierence. In (D1) it is
denied that a proposition’s worldly connections, including those of its sub-
propositional ingredients, enter our concept of truth.at commitment re-
quires much more than scrapping facts and their kin. On the other hand, a
nondeationist, say a correspondence theorist, need only insist that it is in-
tegral to our concept of truth that, at least in the central cases, reality makes
bearers true or false.is modest claim is enough to set up a relational the-
ory of truth, whatever the details.9 To create a true alternative to relational
views a deationistmust disclaim as canonical all dierential interpretations
of the equivalences. However, because the right-hand side contains no se-
mantically evaluable item de jure we cannot rely only on the similarity in
appearance of the formulas on both sides as showing that they convey just
the same thing. By itself this is enough to undermine eorts to extract from
the equivalences the lesson of (D2). In the usual case, the right-hand side
delivers a worldly condition, or a combination of worldly ingredients, ac-
counting for the applicability of the truth predicate in its other term.
Even here, some will protest that deationists can, and do, accept a dif-
ferentiated reading of (R) and (T) if all that amounts to is that the le-hand
side must contain something semantically evaluable while the right-hand
need not. But it is not altogether unheard of for theorists to help themselves
to platitudes which their prior commitments prohibit. And I have yet to see
what deationists, even recent soi-disant “minimalists”, believe can be made
of the right-hand side of the equation while maintaining (D1).10 Perhaps
the response is that they are entitled to a semantically dierentiated read-
9 For simplicity I ignore the variation of a correspondence theory holding that it is only the
property of truth, not its concept, that need be correspondentist, as well as the deationary
view that although truth’s metaphysical liaisons are excluded from its concept, the property
of truth may allow them back in.
10 Although I believe the view both controversial, and, even if true, patently inadequate (see
Vision 2004, 131–134), it has been sowidely held that all a deationist (orminimalist) needs
to claim about the equivalences is that the two sides have the same truth-conditions that
I mention it here just to acknowledge that this possibility has not been overlooked. Why
cannot an inationist hold this? If she can, what is distinctive about deationism? And
how could anything so blatantly circular be a theory of truth?
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ing because no proposition is explicitly invoked on the right-hand side of
their formulas (and, thus, that side cannot be semantically evaluated). But
this seems to me to leave their position up in the air. If minimalists fail to
invoke a proposition on the right-hand side of their equivalences only be-
cause they take their construction to be neutral with respect to the proper
correlate for a correspondence theorist, or to the debate between the various
truth theories (e.g., correspondence. coherence, and pragmatism), or both,
then they simply fail to say enough. e more specic views on which they
refuse to settle are all substantive—thus, relational and metaphysical. One
has not produced an alternative to a list of substantive views just by failing
to opt for one of its items. A genus is not an alternative to, or in competition
with, its various species. On the other hand, if the lack of commitment to
a substantive truth theory is intended to mark the fact that nothing on the
right-hand side remains to be specied (for the concept of truth), it is hard
to see how they can avoid committing themselves to the view that the only
relevant thing is the proposition displayed there. at appears to be a basic
move to (D2). But, if we are to avoid the absurd conclusion that proposi-
tions in which truth is explicitly ascribed (either predicated or prefaced in
a sentential operator) are in general made true by the proposition obtained
when we amputate the truth ascription, then the formulas, as understood
by minimalists, can tell us no more about truth than is revealed by examples
such as:
e proposition that snow is white is true i le jugement que la
neige est blanche est vrai.
at formula certainly does not yield the conditions for the truth of the
proposition that snow is white, but tells us at most that two propositions (or
two expressions of one proposition) have the same truth-conditions. e
fact that “they” are true or false together is not evidence, as some might
declare, that the le-hand proposition does not have or need any truth-
conditions beyond the specier in the instances of (R). If we are to under-
stand the right-hand side of (R) in this way, it provides nothing more than
my hybrid English-French specimen. Finally, if the deationist declines any
of these understandings of her equivalences, the view has yet to tell us any-
thing. We have an elementary understanding of what thewords on the right-
hand side mean, but not of what they signify. us, while we grasp some-
thing, we do not yet know what is being armed.
A hint of the problem may be contained in my deliberately unguarded
use of ‘gloss’ in the phrase ‘austere gloss’. A gloss may range from a state-
ment of a lesson learned from a construction to a reformulation (either qua
analysis or paraphrase) of what is literally conveyed in it. Setting aside is-
sues of conversational implicature, let us grant that reection on instances
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of (R)may, in some sense, reveal that we conveymore economically with the
right-hand side of the biconditional just the message that we could convey
with the words on the le-hand side.atmay be a lesson of these instances.
(Of course, this only applies to cases in which the proposition in question
is explicitly displayed, not to cases like ‘What she said is true’.) However,
it would be a mistake to infer from this alone that it makes the right-hand
side an adequate analysis or paraphrase of what is expressed on the le-hand
side. I doubt that any worthy deationist has been taken in by the vagaries of
‘gloss’ to commit this non-sequitur. But it is not implausible to venture that
some have wrongly inferred from what we can take away as a lesson of these
instances to the conclusion that the two sides convey (that is, semantically
express) the same thing.
In light of the possibility of dierentiated interpretation, we must be
circumspect when construing what others have intended when displaying
(T) or (R) in their expositions. For it would be a mistake to suppose that
authors have not been at least implicitly aware of this distinction between
their right and le sides. In fact, it seems clear that a dierentiated inter-
pretation is a quite natural one across the board. Some who have supposed
that word-world relations were essential to any concept of truth, whether or
not they have been full-blown correspondence theorists, have also accepted
the equivalences, and, on occasion have supposed that their substantial, re-
lational truth theories could be extracted from a proper reading of them.11
Whereas deationists have been quick to deny that these theorists have suc-
ceeded, they have been less solicitous in trying to come to grips with just
what nondeationists might have had in mind, or why the latter could even
have regarded them as insurance against a deationary reading. Might not
it be the case that what metaphysical truth theorists were up to is readily ex-
plained by the fact that they noted (what deationists have been at pains to
suppress) just this dierentiation in the two sides?
In introducing a semantically-dierentiated interpretation of the equiv-
alences I am not claiming that the deationist cannot rely on an austere gloss
of the equivalences to argue her case. For one thing, there are many argu-
ments for deationism that have nothing to do with this issue. A deationist
can regard an austere gloss as a consequence of those other arguments. (I do
claim that a reliance on the view that an austere gloss is the only one in play
has unwelcome consequences for the nal position. Although this might
be a blow against the individual arguments for deationism, that would re-
quire a more thorough analysis of those arguments than is intended here.)
For another thing, a deationist can still maintain that just because the le-
hand term can be replaced without loss by the right-hand term, whatever
11 E.g. Alston (1996), McGinn (2000), Van Cleve (1996).
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worldly conditions the latter or its ingredients may gesture toward has noth-
ing to do with truth. (is seems to have been factored into the thinking
of some authors.12) is familiar deationist strategy is consistent with ac-
knowledging a dierentiated interpretation. Nevertheless, once we allow a
dierentiated interpretation, the dialectical prospects are narrowed. Certain
moves no longer work. For one thing, the dierentiated interpretation is a
sucient explanation of why a nondeationist can acknowledge the equiv-
alences. us, it is unwarranted to suppose that an austere interpretation is
all that users of the equivalence could have had in mind. In this connection,
it is a mistake to suppose that inationary theorists commit a tactical error,
possibly a fatal one, in accepting one of these equivalences. Both claims seem
to rely on the implausible assumption that the equivalences themselves are
sucient to warrant an austere gloss without benet of further argument or
explanation.
3.
I just alluded to disputes surrounding dierential and austere readings of the
equivalences. A good start in coming to appreciate the role of these disagree-
ments is the battle for the allegiance of Alfred Tarski. Tarski’s Convention
T (to a close enough approximation, our (T)) has been central in such dis-
agreements. While many commentators regard Tarski as providing at least
the skeleton of an inationist, if not a correspondence, view, there can be
no question that (T), along with (R), has inspired much deationary the-
ory. In fact, some deationists, including Wolfgang Künne, take Tarski for
one of their own, ignoring the counterevidence for a dierential reading by,
among other things, so-pedaling his use of force-ampliers. Let us take a
closer look at some relevant Tarskian text and Künne’s commentary on it.
Apparently out of step with what was to become a popular tune for (T)’s
later employments, Tarski had written, “We regard the truth of a sentence as
its ‘agreement with reality”’ (Tarski 1983b, 404). And in the introduction to
the classical exposition of his view, (Tarski 1983a, 153), he states, “through-
out this work I shall be concerned exclusively with grasping the intentions
which are contained in the so-called classical conception of truth (‘true—
agreeing with reality’)”. On its most natural reading, those words imply that
truth is a relation between something broadly linguistic and normally extra-
linguistic ingredients and a dierentiated interpretation of the equivalences.
Moreover, in a later summary of those views he notes Aristotle’s famous dic-
tum on ‘is false’ and ‘is true’, and suggests that what it arms, updated, is
captured in:
12 Perhaps David Lewis, e.g. , (Lewis 2001) and Soames (1999).
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(i)e truth of a sentence consists in agreement with (or correspon-
dence to) reality (Tarski 1949, 54).
Immersing himself yet more deeply in inationism, he writes that if we
are allowed to use the notion of designation to apply to whole sentences (and
not just names), “we could possibly use” the following:
(ii) A sentence is true if it designates an existing state of aairs (Tarski
1949, 54).
e stunning fact about thesemutually reinforcing passages is that Tarski
seems willing to take on board such crucial features of inationism in his
paraphrases: in (i) ‘in agreement with reality’ is interpreted as ‘correspon-
dence to’, and in (ii) the correlate of a true sentence is described as “an ex-
isting state of aairs”. Tarski quickly abandons mention of states of aairs,
but he does not suggest that such items are illicit. Rather, he gives reasons
for declining the use the expression in his project: rst, because, as an el-
ement of vague “commonplace language”, it does not give us any reason to
believe that its theory will be consistent (viz., will enable us to avoid familiar
paradoxes), and, second, there is no need to mention states of aairs explic-
itly in his subsequent rigorous reformulations. Perhaps he shares the doubts
aired in §2 about the very idioms by means of which we inaugurate facts
and states of aairs into our conversation. But, that is not a reason he gives
for refusing to talk about them. At most his grounds indicate that if we can
have such intuitively appealing results without needing them to advance our
theories, so much the better. Tarski’s published objections go no farther. To
avoid employing them in one’s theory is not to discountenance them in one’s
ontology, especially if the alternative formulations are thought to be tanta-
mount to the old ones. Indeed, the employment of phrases such as ‘agree-
ment with. . . reality’ and ‘existing state of aairs’ in (i) and (ii), suggests that
aside from their vagueness, they are not ontologically objectionable. Perhaps
Tarski believed otherwise, but the passages typically cited for that claim do
not even begin to make out the case for it.
Against this, Wolfgang Künne holds that it is a mistake to take such re-
marks to indicate that Tarski harbored a relational (= inationary) concep-
tion of truth. He points out that immediately aer explaining that a sen-
tence’s truth is its agreement with reality Tarski adds:
is rather vague phrase, which can certainly lead to various mis-
understandings and has oen done so in the past, is interpreted as
follows. . . [W]e shall accept as valid every sentence of the form ‘the
sentence x is true if and only if p’ where ‘p’ is to be replaced by any
sentence of the language under investigation and ‘x’ by any individual
name of that sentence (Tarski 1983a, 404).
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Künne states that this shows that “the correspondence formula is eluci-
datedwith the help of T-equivalences” (Künne 2003, 210). He tacitly assumes
that this undermines Tarski’s use of the correspondence formula as a way of
showing that he was seriously explicating, or conforming to, a relational no-
tion of truth.
is line of argument assumes an austere interpretation of the equiva-
lences. However, in light of the existence of semantically-dierentiated in-
terpretations, it is not only possible, but quite natural, for Tarski to have seen
in the distinction mentioned between the relevant occurrences of ‘S’ (or ‘x’)
and ‘p’ just the sort of relation between words and world that earlier corre-
spondentists were striving to express, albeit less rigorously. Unless Künne
gives us reason to rule out dierentiated readings, his claim is groundless.
Beyond that, to suppose that Tarski was advancing an austere gloss suggests
that he was being cagy in displaying (i) and (ii) as ways to interpret his views.
Such surreptition would be quite out of character for a writer who was gen-
erally scrupulously clear in his expositions.
Still, there is more to Künne’s case for austerity. He believes we must
interpret Tarski’s phrases in light of their treatment by his teacher, Tadeusz
Kotarbiński, to whom theWahrheitsbegri is dedicated. And, indeed, in an
early footnote (1983a, 153n), Tarski states of the latter’sGnosiology, “inwriting
the present article I have repeatedly consulted this book and in many points
adhered to the terminology there suggested.” Furthermore, when Tarski (in
Künne’s restatement) gives as his proposition (1):
For all sentences x, x is true ⇐⇒ x means that things are thus and
so, and things are thus and so (Künne 2003, 347), translation of Tarski
(1983a, 155).13
he adds in a footnote that “very similar formulations are found in T. Ko-
tarbiński. . . , where they are treated as commentaries which explain approx-
imately the classical view of truth” (Tarski 1983a, 155n). Künne concludes
that we should turn to Kotarbiński for a deeper understanding of Tarski’s
supercially inationary prose.
We shall consider Kotarbiński’s own use of force-ampliers, and Künne’s
commentary on them, in the next section. But, that aside, let us simply re-
turn to Künne’s simple claim that Kotarbiński’s understanding of truth is
deationary, “without any appeal to the notion of facts, but in thoroughly
non-relational terms” (Künne 2003, 209). In a passage we discuss more fully
13 In the Wahrheitsbegri Woodger translates Sachen as ‘state of aairs’ in the two places
where Künne prefers ‘things’. I follow Künne’s version in order to put his own view in its
strongest light by, rst, not slanting Tarski toward a relational interpretation where this
is avoidable, and, second, bringing out what he notes as the striking similarity between
Tarski’s and Kotarbiński’s formulations of the classical conception of truth.
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later, Kotarbiński mentions someone thinking not the truth, but truly. For
Künne this shows Kotarbiński believed truth should be treated adverbially,
as a modication of the episode (act? state? process?) of thinking or be-
lief.at is analogous to adverbialism with respect to perceptual content, in
which the content clause of a perceptual verb is treated as a modication of
the experience: crudely, ‘S sees something red’ is understood on adverbial-
ism as ‘S sees something-redly’. Similarly, truth is to be understood primarily
in terms of the adverb ‘truly’, which is in turn explained by the formula:
‘(K) x thinks truly ⇐⇒ (x thinks that. . . , and. . . )’
where the blanks are lled uniformly.14 Again according to Künne, Kotar-
biński’sReism, in which neither propositions nor any other brand of abstract
entities exist, dictates that this adverb of manner, qualifying x’s thinking,
is the primary alethic notion. Nonadverbial truth and falsity are to be ul-
timately analyzed as qualications of occasions of holding true. ere is
nothing here, no mention of facts or states of aairs, on which to hang a
relation between a verbal something and the nonverbal world. us, when
Kotarbiński writes that in characterizing the classical theory of truth, al-
though “[i]n the classical interpretation, truly means in accordance with re-
ality” (Kotarbiński 1966, 106), he qualies this by stating that “brief reection
suces to recognize the metaphorical nature of such comparison. A dier-
ent interpretation of ‘accordance with reality’ is required” (Kotarbiński 1966,
107). Künne maintains that that interpretation is given by (K).
In opposition to Künne’s construal, I maintain, rst, that Tarski can-
not have held an adverbialist or reist theory; second, that adverbialism and
Reism are not even relevant to interpreting Kotarbiński here; and, nally, in
the context Kotarbiński is not holding that a relational reading of truth (or
its predicate or adverb) is up for consideration. Let us examine these points
in order.
1.e clearly adverbial language Kotarbiński uses should not be enough
to read adverbialism even into his own philosophy. But let us suppose it is.
Although the language in which Kotarbiński’s line of argument is couched is
not as transparent as we might hope, he seems to be most intent on denying
the existence of abstract entities, such as propositions (≈ FregeanGedanken),
or types of sentences, statements, belief contents, etc. is led him to insist
on a concrete truth-bearer; and the token believed (not the believing itself,
but what is believed) had to be a concrete something. Presumably he could
not nd anything conforming to his restriction, and towhich he could attach
truth, other than the state of belief itself. He wished to avoid reintroducing
an abstraction via a conceptually distinguishable content. Conceivably this
14 (Künne 2003, 344). He is not himself convinced that the view works.
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led him to suppose that he must attach it to the verb of belief itself, thus
leading him to favor an adverbial construction over a predicative one.
If that is roughly the route by which Kotarbiński arrived at his conclu-
sion, there is no way to accommodate it in Tarski’s philosophy. For one
thing, Tarski is not concernedwith the objects of belief, butwith language(s).
For another, his truth-bearers are (type) sentences, and not sentences-qua-
asserted. Accordingly, there is no episode—of asserting, believing, enter-
taining, etc.—to be described verbally. us, there is nothing to which to
attach such an adverb. Tarski’s views are quite out of the range of this sort of
tinkering. If the adverbial treatment is therefore an essential ingredient in
the case for reinterpreting ‘accordance with reality’, as Künne presents it, it
is dicult to see how it can bear on Tarski’s view.
2. When Tarski is most explicit about using Kotarbiński’s terminology as
a guide to his own (Tarski 1983a, 153n1), the latter is discussing the respective
merits of classical (correspondence) and utilitarian (Jamesian pragmatist)
theories of truth. And although Kotarbiński frames things in terms of ‘truly’
as well as ‘true’ (Kotarbiński 1966, 106–7), that is not the point he is trying
to get across, or the one Tarski seems intent on expressing in the context.
e feature of each theory being stressed, for both Kotarbiński and Tarski, is
their respective type of truthmaker, accordance with reality in the one case,
useful in some respect in the other.
3. Toward the end of section 17 of Gnosiology, shortly following his ex-
planations of classical and utilitarian views, Kotarbiński oers a critique of
what he takes to be a typical classical theory’s understanding of ‘accordance
with reality.’is is the passage on which Künne relies for his claim that Ko-
tarbiński eschews a relational understanding of truth. is makes it crucial
for the interpretation of Tarski before us. But althoughKotarbiński uses truly
here as well as true, an adverbial reading is, again, not in question. Rather, he
states only that the accord in question cannot be taken pictographically, in
the way a photograph or portrait is meant to resemble its subject. He rightly
notes that ‘good copy or simile’, as it serves in classical theory, is merely a
metaphor. Künne cannot get the mileage out of this caveat that he requires.
Options are readily available for a robust notion of accordance with reality
that do not rely on a literal comparison with pictographic or point-for-point
concordances. Moreover, a number of correspondence theorists have not
been under the sway of picture theories of meaning or truth.15 Kotarbiński
15 See, e.g. J. L. Austin (Austin 1961, 93): “ere is no need whatsoever for the words used in
making a true statement to ‘mirror’ in any way, however indirect, any feature whatsoever
of the situation or event; a statement no more needs, in order to be true, to reproduce the
‘multiplicity’, say, or the ‘structure’ or ‘form’ of reality, than a word needs to be echoic or
writing pictographic.”
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does not say in this place what a better understanding might be. However,
even in the absence of a positive alternative, it is not very persuasive that
giving up the pictographic model of accordance with reality leads directly to
such severe conceptual surgery, leaving no room for any palpable relational
reading of the phrase. It would be overreading this passage to take ‘agree-
ment with reality’ in such an unusually narrow way, much less as an argu-
ment to the eect that Kotarbiński convinced Tarski to give up a relational
conception of truth.
us far I have not mentioned force-ampliers. But they do intrude and
signicantly hamper Künne’s take on Tarski. Earlier I followed Künne’s ren-
dition into semi-formal English of Tarski’s (1): ‘For all sentences x, x is true⇐⇒ x means that things are thus and so, and things are thus and so’. But
Künne not only replaces the phrase ‘states of aairs’ (occurring in the stan-
dard English translation) by ‘things’, but also omits the telling word, ‘indeed’,
that even he could not wholly overlook. Künne’s full translation is:
a true sentence is one which means that things are thus and so,
and things (indeed) are thus and so’.
e italicized phrase is the direct translation of the crucial part of the
sentence from which Künne constructs (1); and aside from the parentheses
around ‘indeed’, it is a close literal translation of Tarski’s words as they ap-
pear in German.16 However, Künne seems condent in omitting that word
from his English rendering of Tarski’s (1), because, he claims, “Tarski him-
self stressed [‘indeed’s’] redundancy” in §18 of (1949) (Künne 2003, 347n96).
What Tarski writes in that place is:
It has been claimed that—due to the fact that a sentence like ‘snow is
white’ is taken to be semantically true if snow is in factwhite. . .—logic
nds itself involved in a most uncritical realism (Tarski 1949, 71).
(Notice that in the original English Tarski writes ‘in fact’ rather than
‘indeed’.) However, rather than stressing in fact’s (or indeed’s) redundancy,
quite the contraryTarskimaintains that it imports content of thewrong kind.
He begins by noting that the words ‘in fact’ are misleading “even if they do
not aect the content.” But do they aect the content? Tarski’s clear verdict is
that they do, because “these words convey the impression that the semantic
conception of truth is intended to establish the conditions under which we
are warranted in asserting any given sentence” (Tarski 1949, 71). Put other-
wise, he holds that they have an epistemic force, a suggestion of assertibility
16 Although Künne also displays the original Polish, of which I have no knowledge, if the
force-amplier did not appear in Polish it strikes me as unlikely that Tarski would have
inserted it in his German version, or that Künne would have needed to make the point he
does about its redundancy.
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conditions.at is howhe takes the charge of an uncritical realism here.at
particular interpretation of ‘in fact’ appears to me, as I think it will to most,
mistaken. Nevertheless, to reject ‘in fact’ because of its alleged epistemic li-
aisons is not to agree with Künne that it is merely redundant, and Tarski’s
assessment does not give us a clue about what he might have thought of its
presence if he was not under this misimpression about its assertibility im-
plications.
4.
Kotarbiński, too, uses force-ampliers. Consider the following passage:
‘Jan thinks truly if and only if
Jan thinks that things are thus and so,
and things are indeed thus and so’.
. . .For instance, the central idea of the Copernican theory is. . . that the
earth revolves around the sun; now Copernicus thought truly, for he
thought that the earth revolves around the sun, and the earth does
revolve around the sun.17
Künne (2003, 344) remarks of the occurrence of ‘indeed’ in the rst sen-
tence that it is “logically redundant.” Elsewhere he states of a similar occur-
rence that it is a “logically superuous adverb.” Let us call such assessments
dismissive. Other than telling what force ‘indeed’ does not have, he does
not say what role it might have in such utterances. A common view accom-
panying dismissive accounts is that force-ampliers merely emphasize, are
emphatic ways of putting forward, the content they qualify. For the special
case of ampliers—viz., this class of phrases, inections, etc. used in clauses
stating truth-conditions or that they have (/have not) been satised—I want
to contrast dismissive accounts with what we may call robust ones. A robust
account regards the ampliers as aecting our understanding of the truth
conditions of the clauses in which they occur. Generally speaking, they can
be robust in one of two ways. First, they might interject additional content
in those clauses (say, as a sentential operator on the order of ‘it is necessary
that’). Second, they may be more like instructions on how to understand
the clause. is last partition is not any sharper than the troubled division
between semantics and pragmatics. But there are clear cases on both sides.
Eventually, I shall oer a robust account of the second type. But rst I want
to examine more closely the character of dismissive accounts.
17 Kotarbiński, as quoted, and translated (from German), in (Künne 2003, 343). e rst
sentence of the English translation from Polish (Kotarbiński 1966, 107) reads “John thinks
truly if and only if John thinks that things are so and so, and things in fact are so and so”
(my emphasis).
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It is not uncommon to nd those who agree with Künne’s negative as-
sessment of ‘indeed’ and other ampliers. Given the context to which I have
restricted force-amplication (viz., the formulation of truth-conditions or
an armation that they have, or have not, been met) it is usually made quite
explicit that this enables one to give an austere gloss of the passage as distinct
from a dierentiated reading. us, for Künne, Kotarbiński’s sentence con-
veys nomore than if the latter wrote ‘Jan thinks truly if and only if Jan thinks
that things are thus and so, and things are thus and so’. Bearing in mind that
the sentence must be enunciated without any emphasis in the second clause,
this construal strikes me as inherently implausible. Has ‘indeed’ no role be-
yond being decorative? Of course, austerity is not mandated by Künne’s ac-
count of the force-amplier. But assuming an austere account is a possibility,
adopting it removes a serious obstacle to a deationary interpretation of this
passage.
It seems equally implausible that the whole point of ‘indeed’ here is to
add emphasis to an independent claim. As mentioned earlier, the expres-
sions cited as force-ampliers are sometimes used merely for emphasis. If
I unfairly doubted that Smith’s intention to enroll in law school was seri-
ous, someone might reply ‘He really did enroll’, or ‘In fact, he enrolled’. As
a matter of fact, each of the terms cited from this class may be strictly used
as an emphasizer when not behaving as a force-amplier, and that employ-
ment may be its more central use. us, remarks such as the following are
in perfectly good order:
In fact, the older version of the soware works better.
Indeed, the highest paid player earns more than the team owner.
Actually, I’d rather nish reading this chapter rst.
Really, you mean to say that she never had formal musical training!
However, when what is at issue is what to make of the constructions in
the contexts to which force-amplication has been restricted, that account
struggles. But before formally presenting my competing force-amplication
thesis let us briey examine the larger point Künne wishes his dismissive
commentary to serve.
He is defending a deationist interpretation of Kotarbiński. e logical
neglibility of indeed brings the latter’s view in line with (R). But equally, the
ability to dismiss the contribution of force-amplication in interpreting its
phrases supports Künne’s own deationary view, a view he calls a modest
account of truth, or MOD. It is summarized in the formula:
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∀x(x is true ⇐⇒ ∃p(x = [p] & p) 18
in which the brackets around ‘p’ are singular-term-forming operators and
can be rendered as the phrase ‘the proposition that. . . ’. eir function is to
take us from a sentence expressing a certain proposition to a term designat-
ing that proposition.
MOD is deationary because it implies that an adequate account of the
notion or property truth (or the predicate ‘is true’) need not invoke any of
a true proposition’s relations to a nonsemantic, nonepistemic reality. It is
played o against what I earlier called, using Künne’s preferred terminology,
a relational account. MOD is, in brief, a renement of (R), the proposition
that p is true if and only if p. For Künne, Kotarbiński not only lends a ca-
chet of respectable lineage to his own account, but his way of achieving his
view is an integral part of Künne’s own rationale. But if Kotarbiński is to be
perceived as clearing the path for deationism, it must be explained why the
presence of ‘indeed’ in the quoted passage does not destroy the picture.is
is the background against which Künne dismisses force-ampliers.
e biconditionals in (R) and (T) dier from the Kotarbiński passage
in two respects that may be ignored for our purposes. First, the contrast in
question is between the sentences (or propositions) on the le- and right-
hand sides of the biconditional rather than between a pair of conjuncts oc-
curring only on the right. Second, the sentences on the right side of the
equivalences need not be, and given their purposes will not be, compounds.
(Given recursion, we donot require separate truth-theorems for (truth-func-
tional) compounds.) But all that matters is that precisely the same issues
concerning force-ampliers arise here. Still, in light of the problems already
uncovered with austere interpretations, Künne’s interpretation would be no
boon to a (supposedly) deationary Kotarbiński.
Rehearsing some of the steps in §2, I cited a potential ambiguity in the
way the equivalences could be, and have been, regarded, between a semanti-
cally dierentiated interpretation and the austere gloss or interpretation that
deationists should favor. Disregarding the various objections I made to the
deationist interpretation, what concerns us now is only the fact that it has
been put into prominent play in the literature.is alone supplies a sucient
motive for those who want to avoid being so understood to signify as much,
and therefore to make clear that what they have in mind is the need to im-
port the extralinguistic world to explain truth. By now it should not surprise
anyone that I am suggesting that this is the core role of force-ampliers:
18 (Künne 2003, 337). I ignore the issue, raised by MOD, of quantication over sentences.
Künne squarely confronts it, and argues that he is entitled to it without resorting to sub-
stitutional quantication
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(FA) Force-ampliers, whenused in constructions stating truth-conditions
(say, in conjunctions and biconditionals), or stating that the condi-
tions have been satised, dictate that the compound is to be given a
semantically dierentiated interpretation.
at, harmlessly simplied, is the thesis I am defending. (FA) is pro-
posed as sucient and central for force-amplication, not as necessary. It
is not intended to exhaust the contexts of such ampliers. In the third ex-
ample with which this essay opened—‘What she suspected was in fact the
case’—no compound occurs and the contents of her suspicion are not dis-
closed. Moreover, force-ampliers may also be used to deny that the truth-
conditions have been satised. When used in those circumstances, only a
limited class of ampliers are appropriate. However, I want to begin by de-
fending (FA) in cases in which truth-conditions, or their satisfaction, are
expressed. We may then extend that role to closely parallel cases. (Some are
discussed in §6.)
e crucial feature of our targeted cases is that two contents are displayed
or implied, and the contents of the two sides are very similarly worded, no
doubt suspiciously so to some. It is not credible to suppose that there is no
point to this ritualized repetition. In the rst part, there is a semantically-
evaluable proposition—something it is possible to regard as taking a seman-
tic value, most importantly a truth-value. Occasionally the proposition is
not given in full, or is given only indirectly. However, the phrasing assures
us of the availability of a similar content speciable at the other end. Or,
in cases mentioned below, in which the force-ampliers are used to arm
the falsity of the content, the second proposition may be like the rst but
for the presence (/absence) of a crucial negative element lacking (/present)
in the rst one. In the clearest cases, such as the rst sentence of the quote
that opened this section, the repetition of the proposition is right there on
the surface. And if we held that the force-ampliers were doing no more
than underlining the preceding utterance, we would be led to the view that
the utterer was saying one thing, and then simply repeating herself emphat-
ically a second time. is would be scarcely more promising than rejecting
a dierentiated interpretation without any alternative to oer.
In sum, it is in contexts where expressions from our designated class
attach either to a display of a truth-condition for a statement, sentence, be-
lief, etc., or to an armation that the condition for truth (or falsity) has ob-
tained, that they serve as dierentiated interpretations for force-ampliers.
Accordingly, I maintain that the occurrence of ‘indeed’ in the Kotarbiński
passage is robust; it signals his dierentiated interpretation of the truth for-
mula. Künne states, following what he takes to be Bolzano’s view, that it “is
logically redundant: it serves the same purpose as the move in that same
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quotation from ‘revolves’ to ‘does revolve”’. But what Künne takes this sec-
ond part of the passage to illustrate is no more persuasive than his account
of the rst one. When Kotarbiński states that Copernicus “thought that the
earth revolves around the sun”, then adds that the earth does revolve around
the sun, the inection (however slight) we give to ‘does’ in the second con-
junct supplies more than mere a repetition of the content of Copernicus’s
thought. It indicates that the thought is true, because the conditions for its
being so have been satised.19 Merely to state that someone thought some-
thing arms nothing, as such, about that thought’s truth.
Curiously enough Künne inadvertently and implicitly attests at least to
the range of force-ampliers by his own summary of his interpretation. He
writes, “A proposition X is true, according to the modest account, if and
only if things really are as they are according to X” (Künne 2003, 373, rst
emphasis mine), and earlier he stated “When is Jan thinking truly (that is, in
agreement with reality) that there are bears in the Capathians? Just in case
Jan is thinking that there are bears in the Carpathians, and there really are
bears in the Carpathians” (Künne 2003, 209, second emphasis mine). I do
not see howKünne can avoid agreeing withme that these occurrences of ‘re-
ally’ are performing precisely the same job as is performed by ‘indeed’ and
‘in fact’ in the earlier examples. But, then, for Künne theymust be “‘logically
redundant’ and, thus, negligible”—the very conclusion he reaches about our
instance of ‘indeed’. Why bother inserting them? at they make some dif-
ference can be seen by trying to rewrite them with ‘really’ deleted. But can
Künne tell us what dierence they make? us far, he has given us no ac-
count of the truth-ampliers to explain this. Might they be mere rhetori-
cal ourishes? What more can he consistently say about them? e only
promising proposal on oer, so far as I can tell, is (FA).
As further support for his view, Künne cites a passage from Frank Ram-
sey (Ramsey 1991, 10) in which the latter used the example, ‘the things he
believed to be connected by certain relations were, in fact, connected by that
relation’. In a footnote attached to the phrase ‘in fact’ Ramsey writes “[i]n a
sentence like this ‘in fact’ serves simply to show that the oratio obliqua in-
troduced by ‘he believed’ has now come to an end. It does not mean a new
notion to be analyzed, but is simpl[y] a connecting particle” ((Ramsey 1991,
19 To drive home the point, and show how Künne’s use of the evidence backres, note that
on his interpretation it would not matter if we replaced these words with the simpler, ‘he
thought the earth revolves around the sun, and the earth revolves around the sun’. is
deviates from Kotarbiński’s statement only by omitting ‘does’ following the second occur-
rence of ‘earth’ (and, as grammar requires, making the second ‘revolve’ agree with the sub-
ject). Try to read the second conjunct naturally without any inection (say on ‘and’ or on
a number of other words in it). I cannot do it. A similar problem emerges with Künne’s
own prose in the next paragraph.
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15n8) reading ‘simply’ for ‘simple’). However, Ramsey, unlike Künne, is of-
fering a positive thesis about the place of ‘in fact’: namely, it shows that the
oratio obliqua clause specifying the belief has come to an end. Nevertheless,
Künne might take solace from this much—according to Ramsey, the force-
amplier is doing nothing further here. And that might be enough to show,
to the latter’s satisfaction, that it is logically superuous.
Ramsey’s explanation is dicult to generalize. However, in the partic-
ular case he oers, it does compete with (FA) as an explanation. us, it is
worth noting that his account fails even on its own turf. Ramsey’s resolution
turns on distinguishing the content of this belief from a belief whose content
would be the whole of the following:
(1) the things connected by certain relations were connected by those
relations.
is utterly trivial belief is of course dierent from that ascribed in Ram-
sey’s example (viz., that things are connected by certain relations). Further-
more, it is not unreasonable to assign a connecting (perhaps conjunctive)
role to ‘in fact’ in this context because the example does not contain any
more typical English connective words (e.g., ‘and’ or ‘but’). But Ramsey’s
case quickly falls apart. First, his claim no longer works if we modify the
example slightly to read:
‘he believed things to be connected by a certain relation and
they were, in fact, connected by that relation’
‘In fact’ is no less natural here, and seems to be playing much the same role
it did in the original example. us, even if it had to do double duty in
Ramsey’s example (because of the absence of any explicit connective), its
primary role is not diminished when we use a dierent term to perform
the role Ramsey cites. Second, the role given ‘in fact’, is ultimately futile
for distinguishing (1) from the actual oratio obliqua. For if the content of
the belief could have been that specied in (1), nothing, save the very same
unnaturalness, prevents it from being:
(2) the things connected by certain relations were, in fact, connected
by those relations.
And in (2) the force-amplier does not indicate that the belief has come
to an end.e point here is that it is natural to parse Ramsey’s original sen-
tence so that the belief specication ends before the word ‘were’. And that
understanding would have been no less natural if the phrase ‘in fact’ had
been absent. us, if we are to nd a role for ‘in fact’ in that example, we
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must look elsewhere. (I do not profess to know why Ramsey’s, and his au-
dience’s, intuitive parsing is the natural one, but an educated guess might
appeal to avoiding the attribution to a subject of so unlikely a remark as (1)
or (2). Compare, for example, Russell’s case of the guest remarking artlessly
to the yacht owner ‘I thought your yacht was larger than it is’, and getting
back the indignant, and clearly contrived, reply ‘No, my yacht is not larger
than it is!’ No interjection of ‘in fact’ aer ‘than’ is needed to construe ‘than
it is’ as an intended worldly condition rather than as a constituent of what
the rst speaker was trying to express—just the point Russell makes.)
I noted earlier that a robust role for force-ampliers might take one of
two forms. Let us look again briey at those options.
First, Evans (1982) and Wiggins (1999) regard the presence of the qual-
ier ‘really’ as basically a sentential operator. eir focus is quite dierent
from the present one,20 and the sentential contexts they treat prevent ‘re-
ally’ from being a force-amplier there. But we could imagine extending
both ‘really’ and the other ampliers as operators governing sentences stat-
ing truth-conditions, and this would involve those ampliers contributing
genuine semantic content to their clauses.
Second, we might take force-amplifiers to be something like a Fregean
assertion sign (Frege 1967, 35–36)21 or a speech-act indicator, what has been
variously called, among other things, a neustic (Hare 1952), mood (Dummett
1981), and function-indicator (Searle 1969).ey do not contribute semantic
content as such, but rather indicate something about how the clause over
which they operate is to be taken.
It might be thought that the rst choice places robust force-ampliers
in better stead. Semantic contributions are weighty. Moreover, if they do
not make a semantic contribution, they must be merely pragmatic elements,
and this throws them into a ragbag category in which they keep company
with such at best marginal denizens as ordinary psychological associations.
Nevertheless, although any decision here must be tentative, I believe it best
to class force-ampliers as indicators of how the clause is to be taken rather
than components of the clauses themselves.e reason is that (on our gener-
ous assumption) the clauses in question are already semantically ambiguous,
and ambiguous constructions already have (at least implicitly) a disjunction
of their permissible meanings. us, everything a semantically dierenti-
ated interpretation of a truth-condition contains is present, even if only im-
plicitly, before force-ampliers come on the scene. For all that the ampliers
20 Roughly, and despite dierences in their treatments, each is concerned with moving out
of ctional contexts to existential claims about elements in the ction. It is doubtful that
anything they say about that will be directly relevant to our concerns.
21 Cf. (Whitehead and Russell 1962, 8).
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make a robust rather than a dismissive contribution to reading the clauses,
for they make one of these interpretations unavoidable. is also has the
advantage of avoiding what would be at least an embarrassment for a robust
account. For, if force-amplication were conceived as making a semantic
contribution, it would be unclear just what semantic contribution it could
make given that the dierentiated interpretationwas already a (natural) pos-
sibility.
To see how neglecting this second prospect for robustness can skew the
discussion, consider a comment by Mark Sainsbury (1999), weighing in on
the issue about ‘really’ addressed by Evans andWiggins. In the course of his
exposition he states emphatically “that ‘really’, at least as used in ordinary
English, makes no contribution to truth conditions” (Sainsbury 1999, 262).
is looks like dismissive commentary. However, upon closer examination
it is clear that he means that ‘really’ adds nothing semantic to truth condi-
tions.is need not prevent it from making a contribution of another kind.
In fact, a subsequent list of functions Sainsbury produces for ordinary uses
of ‘really’ contains an item that comes close to (FA). He calls the function in
question ‘Pre-emptive strike against contrasting views’ (Sainsbury 1999, 263).
is is precisely what (FA) states that force-ampliers do when inserted in
statements of truth-conditions or their satisfaction. us, if we’re not to be
stuck with the stark, inadequate list of choices of either adding something
semantic to truth conditions or being of no informational signicance, we
must acknowledge that ‘really’ can contribute without adding excess seman-
tic content.
What further evidence might be oered on behalf of (FA)? At this stage,
perhaps the best argument available is to take a number of cases in which
force-ampliers have occurred in the literature and in which dismissive ac-
counts of them and austere glosses of the whole phrases are highly implau-
sible. Because there is nothing in the Kotarbiński passage to distinguish it
from these other occurrences, if Künne is correct about that passage, we
ought to be able to extend his negative assessment to these other occur-
rences. us, I briey consider force-ampliers as they have occurred else-
where in the philosophical literature to illustrate further the weakness in
their cavalier dismissals.
5.
I begin with Quine, who declares:
e sentence ‘Snow is white’ is true, as Tarski has taught us, if and
only if real snow is really white (Quine 1970, 10, my emphases).
Unquestionably, ‘real’ is doing more for ‘snow’ than emphasizing that
word. e intended contrast is probably with something in the area of fake
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snow. But I certainly take it also to rule out, by implication, that the ques-
tion is only whether the word—in this case ‘snow’—rather than some other
word, is under consideration. If so, what plausible option is there to regard-
ing ‘really’ as serving the same purpose for ‘is. . .white’? A semantically dif-
ferentiated interpretation is irresistible here and ts well with what Quine
says elsewhere about the determinants of truth.
A second instance. G. E. Moore (1962) asks us to imagine a friend who
believes that he (Moore) has gone away for a holiday: “his belief that I have
gone away cannot be true unless I actually have gone away.” And, in stressing
that this is sucient for its truth as well, Moore adds, “my having actually
gone away formy holidays is both a necessary and sucient condition for the
truth of this belief ” (Moore 1962, 299, rst emphasis added). Unless this last
claim is semantically dierentiated it is hard to see how it could be necessary
and sucient, in the sense Moore intends, for the truth of the belief. Could
the bare proposition (or sentence) ‘I have gone away’ be a truth-condition
for the belief? To add to the implausibility of that interpretation, Moore’s
restatement of the point in the second passage uses the non-propositional,
substantial, phrase ‘my having actually gone away’ which is neither a propo-
sition nor a sentence. Is not it clear that he is intending the same thing in
both passages, although the second is a noun-phrase rather than a sentence,
and thus not a prime candidate for just being another way to express the
same thing as the described belief content of which ‘is true’ is predicated?
Next, BertrandRussell (1999), attacking James’s pragmatic theory of truth,
writes “. . .what I desire is not that the belief in solipsism should be false in
the pragmatic sense, but that people should in fact exist” (Russell 1999, 77,my
emphasis). And, in the same vein he states shortly thereaer that the prag-
matists’ position “if they fully realized it, would, I think, be this: ‘We cannot
know whether, in fact, there is a God or a future life, but we can know that
the belief in God and a future life is true”’ (Russell 1999, 78, my emphasis).
Look again at the part of the latter quotation following the colon. No doubt,
Russell is satirizing a view he takes to be hopeless. If we accept the view that
the force-amplier, ‘in fact’, makes no dierence to the cognitive content of
what is said, we preserve its content without loss if we reword it to read:
We can know that God exists and there is a future life is true,
but we cannot know that God exists and that there is a future
life.
is is close to self-contradiction. It is of the form:
X can know that p is true, but X cannot know that p.
e one thing that saves it from being an outright inconsistency is the
bare conceivability that one might be said to know the truth of something
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(say, on authority) that one does not understand; so that one knows (or, can
know) that p is truewithout knowing that p. However, even if this is intelligi-
ble, it is remote from anything Russell has inmind here. I cannot see anyway
to capture his intent without taking the existence of God and of a future life
to have as their subject-matter conditions in the nonsemantic world. And if
this is so, the interjection of ‘in fact’ would appear to be inserted precisely to
drive that point home.
Next, William Alston (1996) gives as a rst approximation to the view
he wants to defend:
A statement (proposition, belief...) is true if and only if what the state-
ment says to be the case actually is the case (Alston 1996, 5, my em-
phasis).
It is hard to see how anything less than a semantically-dierentiated in-
terpretation could capture Alston’s point. To illustrate, suppose the state-
ment in question is an assertion of the sentence ‘the keys are in my pocket’.
Now “what the statement says to be the case” is not a statement express-
ible with the sentence “the keys are in my pocket’ is true’ or the proposition
that the keys are in my pocket is true. Rather what the statement says to be
the case is simply that the keys are in my pocket, sans any predication of ‘is
true’. If the word ‘actually’ were no more than conversational lagree, as the
dismissive outlook suggests, it would yield no direction about how the cog-
nitive content should be taken. Butmuchmore seems to be going on. For on
the right-hand side we have not only what the deationist demands (‘what
the statement says to be the case’), but also an addendum to it (‘actually is
the case’). is second condition could not add anything to what has gone
before unless Alston had in mind a semantically dierentiated reading.
Next, in the rst sentence of the passage below, Larson and Segal make
clearwithout need for further commentary how they regard the force-amplier
in the second sentence:
[T]he property of being true or false depends on two things: what the
sentence means and how things are in the extralinguistic world.us
Camels have humps is true because it means what it does and because
camels do, in fact, have humps. (Larson and Segal 1995, 5)
Finally, Christopher Hill (2002) takes it for granted that the use of the
force-amplier ‘actually’ makes it clear that the conditions under discussion
are worldly, substantial ones rather than deationary ones. He defends what
he calls a correspondence intuition to the eect that “when a thought counts
as true, it does so in virtue of the fact that the corresponding circumstance
actually obtains.” He then formulates this ocially as:
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“(CT) For any thought x, x is true if and only if there is a state of aairs y such
that (a) x semantically corresponds to y, and (b) y actually obtains” (Hill
2002, 39).
It is evident that Hill believes that (a) might have been understood aus-
terely, or there would be no point to adding (b). What in (b) accomplishes its
dierentiated interpretation? It could not be just the phrase ‘y obtains’; that
is as vulnerable to a deationist construal as ‘x semantically corresponds to
y’ in (a). Rather hemakes the thrust of his remark unmistakable by inserting
the force-amplier ‘actually’. is, then, enables him to state shortly there-
aer that “[i]t is clear that (CT) is at variance with every theory that counts
as a version of classical deationism.”
is train of instances illustrates the quite general practice of using force-
ampliers to make as clear as possible one’s intention to appeal to ina-
tionary truth-conditions. ere is no ground for taking Kotarbiński’s use
of them dierently. Returning briey to the particular case of his would-be
deationism, Künne initially bases his interpretation on his own account of
Kotarbiński’s Reism, given by Künne, you may recall, as:
(K) x thinks truly ⇐⇒ (x thinks that. . . , and. . . ).
But Reism by itself does not install deationism.e resort to an adver-
bial notion of truth, for whatever reason, tells us how to regard the truth-
bearer, but it does not commit us to that bearer acquiring the status of being
truly so in any particular way. (Indeed, the same could be said of Künne’s
MOD.) us, the deationary/inationary status of Kotarbiński’s view de-
pends on how he would regard the second conjunct on the right side of the
biconditional in (K), not on the formulation per se. And it seems he makes
his intentions as clear as we might hope for in the quoted passage at the be-
ginning of §4. (FA) can, of course, stand without Kotarbiński’s support. But
Künne’s commentary is instructive because it is typical of a certain kind of
maneuver adopted for ignoring without toil the most direct way others have
had to make plain their rejection of a deationist construal of their remarks.
6.
e situations treated above are not the only problems confronting an aus-
tere gloss and a dismissive account of force-ampliers. Here are some other
tough cases.
Recall that we have a force-amplier, playing just the role in a speci-
cation of a truth-condition or that one has been satised, even on some
occasions in which no truth predicate or operator appears in the formula.
is eliminates any opportunity for deationist thesis (D2): whatever the
specication of truth-conditions is doing, it cannot be showing howwemay
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state the le-side more simply. In this connection, consider again Ramsey’s
example:
the things he believed to be connected by certain relations were,
in fact, connected by that relation.
On the surface this does not seem to be a compound. However, it is
easy enough to replace it with a compound that still captures the spirit of
Ramsey’s example while having the added advantage of specifying an actual
belief content. For example:
(3) Fred believes that the species are connected by common descent
and, in fact, they are connected by common descent.
While it may seem promising in a case such as ‘it is true that snow is
white’ to say that ‘snow is white’ expresses the same thing, only more parsi-
moniously, no one will be tempted to say that ‘snow is white’ says the same
thing as ‘Fred believes that snow is white’. Still, in (3) we do have the same
range of potential semantic values for the propositional clause in the rst
conjunct, and the same sort of nonsemantic condition in the second—the
one expressing that the truth-conditions for Fred’s belief are satised. Fur-
thermore, because the point is just as strong without the interjection of the
force-amplier, let us provisionally delete it. Nevertheless, a dierentiated
interpretation seems mandatory here. e designator in the rst conjunct,
the content of Fred’s belief, designates what is, broadly speaking, semantic.
I am not supposing that Fred must have expressed, or even be able to ex-
press, his thought in words, not even sotto voce.22 us, the phrase may be
evaluable only on one’s favorite psychosemantics, not on its linguistic twin.
However, as long as we have a propositional content designated, expressions
of semantic appraisal such as ‘is true’, ‘is about’, ‘describes . . . as’, and so on are
appropriate characterizations. Moreover, we are prohibited from concluding
that the proposition designated by those words (at least without considera-
tion of the second conjunct) must be a (nonsemantic) fact—Fred may have
a false belief.us, it is not an accident that the le-hand conjunct need not
contain a truth predicate or operator to clarify the way it is to be read.
In spite of that, the satisfaction of the belief ’s truth-condition is specied
in the second conjunct.at conjunct’s semantic liaison will be some sort of
worldly condition or n-tuple of particulars and features. What appears on
the right-hand side is not destined ex vi termini to have as a value a semantic
22 Pace Plato (in the voice of the stranger): “inking and discourse are the same thing, ex-
cept that what we call thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind
itself without spoken sound” (Plato 1961, 263e). Or, as Peter Geach once remarked about
Hobbes, for him ratio is oratio.
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component. What is specied there is quite literally something occurring ‘in
deed’ rather than in thought or speech. So, it seems that an austere gloss is
not in the ong. If we do not opt for a dierentiated interpretation, in the
absence of a new entrant we seem lewithout any suggestions for construing
(3).
Next, there are also instances in which a rst conjunct has a constituent
designating a semantically evaluable item, but in which the satisfaction con-
ditions specied in the second conjunct (with the help of force-ampliers)
are not truth-conditions. Strictly speaking, occurrences of interjections in
these cases cannot be force-ampliers as earlier dened. Nevertheless, they
are close enough to our target cases to hold lessons for our subject:
(4) e score called for the passage to be played slowly, and, indeed
(/in fact), it was performed slowly. (/. . . and it really was performed
slowly).
(5) He painted the Duke with a crooked smile, and (/because), indeed,
the Duke had a crooked smile.
A musical score and a portrait are representations, and thus admit se-
mantic evaluation. Nevertheless, there is no way in which the musical per-
formance or the Duke’s smile could be assimilated to the content of a score
or to paint on canvass. Such cases drive home the point that Künne’s and/or
Ramsey’s dismissive summaries of force-ampliers do not apply in these
strikingly analogous cases. Strangely enough, in these instances it is plau-
sible to argue that the relevant expressions are inserted precisely for empha-
sis. (Recall that although neither Künne nor Ramsey explicitly give this as
a role for ampliers, it is a natural move on the part of those who hold that
ampliers add nothing to the interpretation or content of the clauses.) But
what they emphasize in these cases can be nothing other than the worldly-
conditions preventing a deationary reading of them. I would venture that
such cases seem not only to strengthen (FA), but also point toward a natural
extension of it.
More bluntly still, sometimes the second conjunct, even when truth-
conditions are in play, shows a departure from the semantically evaluable
part.us:
(6) Jan thinks he won the gold medal, but in fact he only won the silver.
(7) e score called for the passage to be played largo, but, indeed (/in
fact) it was played much too fast.
(8) He painted the Duke with a crooked smile, but the Duke does not
actually have a crooked smile.
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It is dicult to believe that the interjections ‘indeed’, ‘actually’, and ‘in
fact’ are performing a service so dierent in kind in (4)–(8) than those they
were performing in (3). And in (4)–(8) it seems clear that they are ruling out
any trace of doubt that the second conjunct takes us from a representational
content to the part or aspect of the world relevant to the respective repre-
sentation’s evaluation. ere may be a reduced urgency for force-ampliers
in such cases, but it has not been shown that they are wholly pointless; at
worst they belabor something that typical audiences will have already taken
for granted.
7.
Finally, a brief glimpse at how the terms we have enlisted for their role in
(FA) enter into broader conicts over representational theories.e simplest
case is reference. Suppose for the sake of argument it is maintained that the
following is an instance of a legitimate condition for reference:
(10) ‘N. Bourbaki’ refers to N. Bourbaki only if N. Bourbaki exists.
Telescoping a number of anti-representationalist arguments, the dea-
tionist viewherewould be thatN. Bourbaki’s existing comes to nothingmore
than facts about our usage of the name ‘N. Bourbaki’. It does not invoke
name-world relations.
While the interjection of the terms in the title does not settle the issue
between representational and nonrepresentational theories of reference, any
more than it settled the issue between deationary and correspondence the-
ories of truth, an extension of (FA) to these sorts of cases does, I am hopeful,
eliminate one sort of maneuver which may have attracted nonrepresenta-
tionalists. at is, by interjecting one of these terms on the right-hand side
of the conditional, and obtaining, say:
(10′) ‘N. Bourbaki’ refers to N. Bourbaki only if N. Bourbaki actually
exists
a speaker may make plain her intention that the condition for reference in
question be something, as we might say, worldly.is interpretation can be
ruled out only if one holds that these terms cannot have any role in contribut-
ing to or indicating something about the content of the relevant clauses in
which they appear. Since we have seen that view to have failed as a general
prescription, we have good reason to reject it here. If we then extend our
notion of a force-amplier to the occurrence of such terms in any context
supplying representational conditions, we could easily enough extend (FA)
to representation generally:
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(FAr) Force-ampliers, whenused in constructions stating representational
conditions (including conditions for truth and reference), or in in-
dicating (/signifying) that the conditions have been satised, signify
that the compound (or implicit compound) is to be given a seman-
tically dierentiated interpretation.
In sum, the issues raised earlier can supply considerations bearing on the
entire spectrum of deationary semantic theories.
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